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How the World Survived 
the Population Bomb
An Economic Perspective 
David Lam
University of Michigan
The population of the world doubled between 1960 and 2000, grow-
ing from 3 billion to 6 billion people. This is by far the largest increase 
in world population over a period of two generations in human history, 
measured in either absolute numbers or percentage increase. In terms 
of the world’s ability to meet increasing demands on resources, the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century offered an experiment unlike anything 
seen before. As we think about issues of sustainable development fac-
ing the world today, it is instructive to look back on the lessons of this 
unique period of human history. 
It is entirely appropriate to think of the rapid growth of world pop-
ulation between 1950 and 2000 as a “population explosion.” Viewed 
from the perspective of the 1960s, when the rate of growth reached 
its peak, it is not surprising that there were concerns that this popula-
tion explosion would put enormous pressure on the world’s economic 
resources. Many predicted mass starvation, large increases in poverty, 
and depletion of key resources in the decades to follow. We now have 
accumulated more than three decades’ worth of data since many of 
these predictions were made, and more than four decades’ worth since 
the population growth rate reached its peak. This chapter will survey 
several key economic indicators related to some of the worst fears about 
the impact of population growth on humans. The data on economic 
variables, including food production, commodity prices, and poverty, 
suggest that the world not only survived the population explosion but 
was in better condition by most of these indicators in 2000 than it was 
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in 1960. The past four decades have been a period of rising per capita 
food consumption, with significant declines in both the percentage and 
the absolute number of people in poverty. While poverty rates remain 
unacceptably high in many countries, with especially disappointing 
progress having been made in Africa, the global picture of the latter 
half of the twentieth century presents the surprising combination of an 
unprecedented population explosion occurring at the same time as rapid 
declines in poverty. 
If we have the hindsight to say the world survived the population 
bomb, it follows that the population explosion is over. In addition to 
looking at trends in key economic indicators, this chapter examines 
the demography of the population explosion. As demographers have 
long pointed out, the population explosion resulted from rapid declines 
in mortality that produced a relatively short period of extremely high 
growth. While the world’s population continues to grow, fueled in part 
by the inertia of rapid growth during the peak of the population explo-
sion, rapidly declining birth rates imply that growth rates will contin-
ue to fall in coming decades, moving the world into a period of much 
slower growth. Growth has already dropped below the rate of 1950. 
With the growth rate in 2000 returning to roughly the level of 1950, 
it seems appropriate to consider 1950 and 2000 as convenient book-
ends for the population explosion in examining both its demography 
and its economics. An economic perspective helps us understand how 
the world avoided mass starvation; it also helps explain why birth rates 
have fallen so rapidly throughout the developing world. 
This chapter will take a broad look at the world, with examples 
from many different countries, but in addition, its last part will look in 
detail at fertility decline in Brazil. Brazil is an interesting case study be-
cause it had a rapid decline in birth rates in the absence of a significant 
national family planning effort. The fertility rate in Brazil is now about 
the same as the fertility rate in the United States. This chapter argues 
that the response of parents to falling infant mortality and the impact 
of rising parental education levels played an important role in Brazil’s 
incredible fertility decline. An economic model of optimizing behavior 
based on tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of children (the 
former term refers to the quality of their lives and the investments made 
in them) provides a framework for explaining these responses at the 
household level.  
How the World Survived the Population Bomb   101
THE HISTORY OF WORLD POPULATION GROWTH
We begin with a historical overview of world population growth. 
Figure 5.1 shows estimates of the total population of the world from 
1500 to 2000, along with projections from 2000 to 2050.1 It demon-
strates that the population growth of the twentieth century, and especial-
ly of the second half of the twentieth century, skyrocketed. The world 
did not reach 1 billion population until 1800, reached 2 billion around 
1930, and then added another 4 billion people in the next 70 years. 
If we work backward from the 2000 population of 6 billion, an inter-
esting benchmark would be the time when the world population was 1/32 
(2-5) this size, or 187.5 million, meaning that the world has subsequently 
doubled in population five times. A common estimate for the popula-
tion of the world in 1 AD is 300 million, although estimates range from 
170 million to 400 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). The estimates 
reported by the Census Bureau suggest that a population of 187.5 mil-
lion might have existed around 300 BC. A population twice this large, 
375 million, may have been reached around 1200 AD, a doubling time 
Figure 5.1  Total World Population from 1500 to 2000 and U.N. High, 
Medium, and Low Variant Projections to 2050
SOURCE: Estimates for 1500–1950 are from U.S. Census Bureau (2003); estimates 
for 1950–2000 and high, medium, and low variant projections for 2000–2050 are 


































of 1,500 years. Continuing with subsequent doublings of population, 
the world reached 750 million around 1700, 1.5 billion around 1860, 
and 3 billion around 1960. In round numbers, then, the sequence of five 
doubling times since the world was 1/32 of its 2000 population is roughly 
1500 years, 500 years, 150 years, 100 years, and 40 years. 
Given this sequence of doubling times, it is natural to ask what the 
next doubling time will be—that is, when will world population reach 
12 billion? While the answer obviously requires conjecture, it is virtu-
ally impossible that the next doubling time would be less than 40 years, 
and very unlikely that it would be less than 100 years. Figure 5.1 shows 
three population projections from 2000 to 2050 made by the United 
Nations Populations Division. Even the high variant projection only 
reaches 10.6 billion by 2050, a rate of increase far short of the previ-
ous doubling (although it would be a larger absolute increase than took 
place between 1960 and 2000). The medium variant projection does not 
even reach 9 billion by 2050. In fact, many forecasts predict that world 
population will never again double. The United Nations Population Di-
vision (1999, p. 5) has projected that world population will reach about 
9.5 billion in 2100, 9.75 billion in 2150, and will stabilize sometime af-
ter 2200 at just above 10 billion. Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov (2001) 
use a model of probabilistic population projections in which their me-
dian forecast predicts that world population will peak in 2070 at 9 bil-
lion. They estimate that there is an 85 percent chance that the world will 
reach population stability by 2100. 
While it is obviously difficult to forecast world population, there is 
nonetheless quite a bit of information to use for such forecasts, given 
current age distribution, trends in fertility and mortality, and past expe-
rience (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000). The picture of population growth 
becomes clearer if we look at growth rates rather than totals. Figure 
5.2 shows the annual rate of population growth from 1900 to 2000, 
with United Nations projections to 2050.2 The annual growth rate of 
0.6 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century was already quite 
high by historical standards. From there, we see that growth rates rise 
to a level of 1 percent a year around 1930. They then increase dramati-
cally in the 1950s, reaching about 1.4 percent in 1950 and rising to 1.9 
percent by 1958. The sharp short-term drop around 1960 and 1961 is 
due to the Great Famine in China, which killed more than 18 million 
Chinese, causing such a jump in death rates that it dropped the world 
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population growth rate by almost half a percentage point. The world 
reached its peak growth rate according to these estimates in 1964, at 
2.16 percent a year (implying a doubling time of about 32 years if the 
rate remained constant). The growth rate declined fairly rapidly in the 
1970s, remained fairly stable in the 1980s, and has been falling steadily 
since around 1990. The world’s growth rate in 2000 was about 1.3 per-
cent, lower than in 1950. Even the high variant U.N. projection shows 
steadily falling growth rates from 2000 to 2050. The medium variant 
projection has the growth rate dropping below 1 percent by 2015, drop-
ping below 0.5 percent by 2040, and continuing to fall after that.   
WHAT CAUSED THE POPULATION EXPLOSION?
These figures suggest that the world will almost surely never again 
see population growth of the magnitude experienced in the past half-
century. In order to understand how the world survived this population 
explosion and why it is unlikely to ever be repeated, it is necessary to 
Figure 5.2  Annual World Population Growth Rate, Actual and 
Projected, 1900 to 2050a
a Rates to 2000 are three-year moving averages; rates after 2000 are based on five-year 
projections (see Note 2). 
SOURCE: Estimates for 1900–1950 are from U.S. Census Bureau (2003); estimates 
for 1950–2000 and high, medium, and low variant projections for 2000–2050 are 




























understand what caused it in the first place. The demographic explana-
tions for the dramatic increase in the world population growth rate in the 
1950s and 1960s are well understood. The annual percentage increase 
in world population in a given year (the measure shown in Figure 5.2) 
is entirely determined by the difference between birth rates and death 
rates. Demographers define the crude birth rate (CBR) as the number 
of births in a year per 1000 population, and the crude death rate (CDR) 
as the number of deaths per 1000 population. The crude rate of natural 
increase (CRNI) is simply the difference between these. If the CRNI is 
10 per 1000, the population growth rate is 1 percent a year. Given these 
standard measures, we can analyze the extent to which either changes in 
the crude birth rate or changes in the crude death rate were responsible 
for producing the increase in the population growth rate in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
The Demographic Transition
Figure 5.3 shows the crude birth rate, crude death rate, and crude 
rate of natural increase for the world between 1950 and 1999, based on 
United Nations Population Division estimates (2003). These are five-
year averages, in contrast to the single-year estimates shown in Figure 
5.2. The peak growth rate occurs at just above 2 percent a year in the 
1965–1969 period. (Since these data are averaged over five years, they 
do not show the sharp drop associated with China’s Great Famine that 
was seen in the annual estimates in Figure 5.2.) One of the striking fea-
tures of Figure 5.3 is that both the crude birth rate and the crude death 
rate fall over the entire period shown. The reason the population growth 
rate increased between the periods of 1950–1954 and 1965–1969 is that 
the death rate fell faster than the birth rate. Falling infant and child 
mortality played a major role in the falling death rate. Not only did 
the birth rate not increase during this period, it was already falling in 
the 1950s and continued falling throughout the period that population 
growth rates were increasing. 
Statistics are not available, but if we extended Figure 5.3 back sev-
eral decades, we would find that crude birth rates were probably in the 
range of 40–45 per 1000, not significantly higher than observed around 
1950. Crude death rates, on the other hand, would have been consider-
ably higher than the 20 per 1000 level observed in 1950. We know that 
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crude death rates must have been close to crude birth rates earlier in the 
twentieth century since the population growth rate was close to 0.5 per-
cent (5 per 1000). Death rates had already fallen substantially by 1950, 
producing the growth rates of over 1.5 percent shown in Figure 5.3. 
The pattern shown for the world as a whole would have been broad-
ly similar to the pattern observed in most developing countries. Begin-
ning from a regime with high birth rates, high death rates, and relatively 
low population growth, developing countries saw their death rates de-
cline during the first half of the twentieth century. Birth rates initially 
remained at their previous level, generating a gap between birth rates 
and death rates that caused increased population growth. The popula-
tion growth rate continued to increase until birth rates began to fall fast 
enough to offset falling death rates. This occurred in the 1965–1969 
period for the world (Figure 5.3), beginning a period of declining popu-
lation growth rates. About this time, death rates stabilized at a low level 
of around 10 per 1000, with further declines in birth rates leading to fur-
ther declines in the rate of population growth. This process, known as 
the demographic transition, has played out in similar fashion through-
out the developing world, with variations in the timing and pace of the 
transition. A century earlier, the demographic transition had occurred 
Figure 5.3  Crude Birth Rate, Crude Death Rate, and Rate of Natural 
Increase for the World, 1950–1999
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in similar fashion in most of the countries that currently have high in-
comes. The difference was that death rates fell much more gradually, 
with the result that peak growth rates during the transition were typical-
ly lower than those observed in developing countries 100 years later.
Population Momentum 
The other dynamic is population momentum. Since childbearing is 
concentrated in the 20–35 age range, a large increase in births in a given 
period will lead to a corresponding increase in the size of the childbear-
ing population 20–35 years later. This creates a powerful mechanism 
for population momentum, implying that even though there were sharp 
reductions in fertility in the 1970s and 1980s, the numbers of births in 
many countries will continue to grow for several decades, the result 
of increasing numbers of women of childbearing age. This holds true 
even for countries that have already reached replacement fertility. This 
dynamic also helps explain why we can predict the path of population 
growth with some precision. One reason we can be certain the world 
population growth rate will decline steadily between now and 2050 is 
that the current growth rate is only as high as it is because of popula-
tion momentum. The size of the childbearing population can be fairly 
easily projected for the next 20 years, since many of those women have 
already been born. While the number of women of childbearing age 
will continue to increase for several decades, the growth rate of that 
population is falling rapidly. This must translate into falling population 
growth rates, even if fertility rates were to stop falling.  
THE IMPACT OF THE POPULATION EXPLOSION
Given the unprecedented rates of population growth that appeared 
in the 1950s and 1960s, it is understandable that there were concerns 
about the potential social and economic consequences of this rapid 
growth. Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, which came out in 1968, 
was one of the best-known books expressing alarm over the high rates 
of population growth. Ehrlich focused particularly on the challenge of 
feeding the increasing numbers of people in developing countries. He 
wrote, “The world, especially the developing world, is rapidly running 
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out of food . . . In fact, the battle to feed humanity is already lost, in the 
sense that we will not be able to prevent large-scale famines in the next 
decade or so” (1968, p. 36). Lester Brown struck a similar note when 
he wrote in a 1967 article in Science that “conventional agriculture now 
provides an adequate and assured supply of food for one-third of the 
human race. But assuring an adequate supply of food for the remain-
ing two-thirds, in parts of the world where population is increasing at 
the rate of 1 million weekly, poses one of the most nearly insoluble 
problems confronting man” (1967, p. 604). The computer simulations 
of the Club of Rome’s well-known The Limits to Growth (Meadows et 
al. 1972) focused attention on depletion of nonrenewable resources and 
resulting increases in commodity prices.
Trends in Economic Indicators
There have been extensive debates about trends in economic, so-
cial, and environmental indicators in recent decades. It is far beyond the 
scope of this chapter to provide an exhaustive review of those debates, 
or to propose resolutions to the complex issues involved. Some of these 
debates have been closely tied to discussions about the impact of rapid 
population growth, with many going back to the predictions made by 
Ehrlich and others who gave early warnings. In this section, I provide 
a broad description of trends in several key economic indicators during 
recent decades. These include food production, commodity prices, and 
poverty. 
These variables go to the heart of many of the worst fears about the 
potential impact of rapid population growth. Mass starvation, exhaus-
tion of nonrenewable resources, and increased poverty were certainly 
some of the major concerns among a wide variety of observers who 
considered the impact of rapid population growth during the 1960s. It 
is hard to imagine a more challenging test of the world’s capacity to 
absorb population than for it to double its population in 40 years, es-
pecially when this doubling means the addition of 3 billion people. As 
Lester Brown wrote in his 1967 Science article, in which he (accurately) 
predicted the addition of at least 1 billion people by 1980, “The world 
has never before added 1 billion people in 15 years.” 
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Trends in Food Production
In the 1960s, there was probably no more daunting challenge as-
sociated with rapid population growth than that of feeding the growing 
population. The prologue to The Population Bomb began, “The battle 
to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo 
famines—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in 
spite of any crash programs embarked upon now” (Ehrlich 1968).
Data on agricultural production are provided by the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and are readily avail-
able on that organization’s Web site (FAO 2004). Figure 5.4 presents 
indices of total food production, per capita food production, and total 
population for the world from 1961 to 2003, setting the 1961 levels to 
100 as a baseline for all three indices. As the figure indicates, the world 
has experienced steady and dramatic increases in food production since 
1961. Total food production in the world roughly doubled between 1961 
and 1990, and by 2003 it had reached a level 2.7 times the amount in 
1961. The average rate of growth of food production between 1961 and 
2003 was 2.4 percent a year. Significantly, Figure 5.4 shows that the line 
for total food production is always above the line for total population, 
Figure 5.4  Indices of World Food Production and Population, 1961–2003 
(1961=100)
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even during the period of the most rapid population growth, the 1960s. 
Thus, at any point between 1961 and 2003, food production increased 
faster than world population relative to the 1961 baseline. The average 
growth rate of world population from 1961 to 2003 was 1.7 percent a 
year, yet per capita food production grew at an average annual rate of 
0.7 percent. Per capita food production in 2003 was 31 percent higher 
than it was in 1961.
One reason for the world’s remarkable increase in agricultural out-
put since the 1960s has been the green revolution’s technological ad-
vances in developing new high yield crops. While we cannot assume 
that the growth rates of the past 40 years in food production can be 
maintained, it is interesting to look at forecasts of food production made 
at various points between the 1960s and today. Lester Brown concluded 
in a 1975 article in Science that “the scarcity of basic resources required 
to expand food output, the negative ecological trends that are gaining 
momentum year by year in the poor countries, and the diminishing re-
turns on the use of energy and fertilizer in agriculture . . . lead me to 
conclude that a world of cheap, abundant food with surplus stocks and 
a large reserve of idled cropland may now be history. In the future, 
scarcity may be more or less persistent, relieved only by sporadic sur-
pluses, of a local and short-lived nature” (1975, p. 1059). In addition 
to his dire prediction about overall food production, Brown expressed 
concern that the world was becoming increasingly dependent on North 
America as its food producer. In fact, however, FAO data indicate that 
between 1965 and 1975, food production increased at an annual rate of 
2.9 percent in developing countries, compared to a rate of 2.4 percent 
in North America. 
Although impressive growth in food production continued through 
the late 1970s, Brown (1981) again expressed concern in another Sci-
ence article: “As the 1980s begin, the growth in world production is 
losing momentum and its excess over population growth is narrowing” 
(p. 1001). But in fact the annual growth rate of world food production 
in the 1980s turned out to be 2.5 percent, slightly higher than the growth 
rate between 1965 and 1980 and a full percentage point greater than the 
growth rate of world population. Additional concerns were raised at the 
end of the 1980s. Paul and Anne Ehrlich (1990) wrote in The Popula-
tion Explosion, a follow-up to The Population Bomb, that “world grain 
production peaked in 1986 and then—for the first time in forty years—
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dropped for two consecutive years . . . Global food production peaked 
in 1984 and has slid downward since then” (p. 15). 
 A couple of years after the Ehlichs’ book, Robert McNamara (1992) 
wrote that “The early gains of the Green Revolution have nearly run 
their course. Since the mid-1980s, increases in worldwide food produc-
tion have lagged behind population growth.” It is not clear exactly what 
data the Ehrlichs and McNamara were referring to, although it is pos-
sible that their comments were consistent with the data available at the 
time they wrote. The FAO data shown in Figure 5.4 clearly tell a much 
different story. Figure 5.4 shows that both total and per capita food pro-
duction for the world increased throughout the 1980s, although there 
are occasional years when per capita food production declined, such 
as a 1 percent decline between 1986 and 1987. The record after these 
prognostications is even more positive, with food production growing 
significantly faster than population in the 1990s. While it is easy to find 
observers in the 1970s, 1980s, and today warning that the success of the 
green revolution cannot last forever, the data indicate remarkable and 
sustained success in food production for more than four decades, with 
no evidence that future food production will not keep pace with popula-
tion growth, especially given the declining rate of growth.   
While the experience of the world as a whole is one important 
summary statistic, it is also interesting to look at the experience of in-
dividual countries. India was singled out by Ehrlich for particular at-
tention in The Population Bomb. Ehrlich quoted one expert on Indian 
agriculture who predicted that India had reached its maximum level 
of food production in 1967–1968. At that time, India’s population was 
growing at more than 3 percent a year (implying a doubling time of less 
than 25 years), and it was one of the places where Ehrlich and many 
others predicted mass starvation. Figure 5.5 shows food production in 
India from 1961 to 2003 based on the same FAO data used for Figure 
5.4, once again using 1961=100 as the baseline. India’s food production 
over the period actually grew faster than food production for the world 
as a whole, and 2003 production was 2.9 times greater than the level in 
1961. Even so, the line for per capita food production in Figure 5.5 in-
dicates that India’s food production did not grow fast enough to keep up 
with its population during some periods in the 1960s and 1970s—per 
capita food production fell by about 10 percent between 1961 and 1966. 
These were temporary shortfalls, however, and per capita food produc-
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tion returned to its 1961 level by 1970. It fell again slightly in the mid-
1970s, returned to its 1961 level in 1980, and then remained above its 
1961 level in the 1980s and 1990s. 
As with the world data, India’s impressive increases in food output 
in the late 1960s and the 1970s were followed by numerous predictions 
that the success could not be sustained. Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990) ac-
knowledged India’s “dramatic increases in wheat production between 
1965 and 1983” but noted that “since 1983, India’s rising grain produc-
tion has lost momentum” and warned that “the country appears to be 
facing a catastrophic problem in the 1990s, if not earlier” (pp. 70–72). 
The FAO data indicate that food production in India actually grew by 
2.3 percent a year between 1990 and 2003, 0.5 percent faster than the 
growth rate of the population. By 2003 India’s per capita food produc-
tion was 23 percent above its 1961 level (and 43 percent above the low 
observed in 1966), even though the Indian population in 2003 was 2.4 
times larger than in 1961. 
While India has done much better at producing food than almost any 
observer could have predicted in the 1960s, as has the world as a whole, 
not all regions of the world have done so well. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been much less successful at feeding itself over this period. Figure 5.6 
shows total food production, per capita food production, and population 
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for sub-Saharan Africa from 1961 to 2003. Total food production for 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 was 2.7 times the level of 1961. This is in 
many respects an impressive increase, but it was not sufficient to keep 
pace with Africa’s rapid population growth: per capita food production 
in sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 was 14 percent below the level of 1961. 
Most economists looking at the disappointing performance of agricul-
ture in Africa agree that the problems are not fundamentally related to 
resource constraints or rapid population growth. 
“In the case of sub-Saharan Africa,” writes Gale Johnson (1999), 
“the failure to achieve a significant increase in per capita food supplies 
has been due, not primarily to limitations of natural resources, but to 
wholly inappropriate national policies that exploited agriculture in the 
name of promoting economic development as well as by ethnic and 
civil strife in several countries” (p. 5915). As an example of the policies 
that have discouraged food production in Africa, Johnson mentions the 
World Bank study of agricultural pricing policy, which estimated that 
effective returns to African farmers declined by 51.6 percent between 
1960 and 1984 as a result of governmental interventions in agricultural 
markets (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1988). 
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While the decline in per capita food production in Africa shown in 
Figure 5.6 is a very serious problem, it does not negate the relatively 
optimistic picture of global food capacity provided by the evidence 
from other regions. The disappointing African experience also points 
to some of the reasons for the positive experience of the past 40 years 
in the rest of the world. The rapid increases in global food production 
are not simply the result of technological innovation in agriculture. As 
frequently pointed out by agricultural economists, getting economic in-
centives right in agricultural sectors within countries and liberalizing 
agricultural trade across countries are key factors in generating world 
agricultural output. It is also important to recognize the role played by 
increased human capital. As Johnson (2000) posed the question in his 
presidential address to the 2000 meeting of the American Economic As-
sociation (AEA), “What made it possible for the world to escape from 
what could be called the Malthusian trap? The answer is simple: the 
creation of knowledge” (p. 2).  
Leaving aside regional imbalances in food production in recent de-
cades, we must recognize that even increased per capita food produc-
tion within a particular country does not necessarily translate into re-
ductions in hunger in that country. Distribution of food, like distribution 
of income, is very unequal both within and across countries. Examining 
the distribution of resources within countries requires household level 
data. Below I will look at estimates of trends in poverty for the world as 
a whole and for specific regions and countries. Since these estimates are 
usually based on measures of consumption at the household level, they 
are the best evidence regarding trends in hunger in the world. 
Trends in Commodity Prices
The impressive story of how world food production kept pace with 
world population during the population explosion might be considered 
a story of remarkably good luck, in that green revolution innovations 
came along at just the right time to keep up with the population explo-
sion. Concerns about the impact of the population explosion were not 
limited to food, however. Rapid population growth was also predicted 
to cause scarcity with many other types of commodities. In order to 
investigate these issues we can look at data on a wide range of other 
commodities, both renewable (like food) and nonrenewable. This was 
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one of the points made by Julian Simon in his book The Ultimate Re-
source (1981). Simon upheld the standard notion of economists that 
one of the best indicators of whether the world is running out of a re-
source is whether the price of that resource is increasing. While various 
nonmarket forces, such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) cartel, might create distortions between price and 
resource supply, it would be difficult to have a situation in which a 
commodity is nearing depletion at the same time that the price of the 
resource is declining. 
Simon’s emphasis on the tendency of most commodity prices to 
decrease over time led to a famous bet between himself and Paul Ehr-
lich (Tierney 1990). Simon challenged any taker to pick any natural 
resource and any future date, and he would bet that the real price of the 
resource would decline. Ehrlich and a group of colleagues selected five 
metals—chrome, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten—for the period from 
October 1980 to October 1990. The outcome was that the real price of 
each of these five commodities declined between 1980 and 1990, and 
the bundle of five metals that cost $1000 in 1980 (in quantities that cost 
$200 each) could be bought for $618 in 1990 (adjusted for inflation). To 
settle the bet, Ehrlich sent Simon a check for $576.07, the decline in the 
total cost of the five metals using 1990 prices. 
Data on commodity prices are relatively easy to come by, since 
commodities are the focus of very active and highly competitive in-
ternational markets. The data presented here are taken from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2001). Figure 5.7 shows real 
commodity price indices from 1960 to 2000, using 1960=100 as the 
baseline. All prices are adjusted for inflation. Four broad indices are 
shown—food, agricultural products, metals and minerals, and all non-
energy commodities. Although each index has periods of price increases 
over the four decades, the clear trend is downward for all four indices. 
The price decline between 1960 and 2000 is 40 percent for metals and 
minerals, 54 percent for food, 60 percent for agricultural commodities 
overall, and 54 percent for the combined index of all nonenergy com-
modities. For this last category, the combined index of all nonenergy 
commodities, the price is lower in every period between 1960 and 2000 
than it was in 1960. 
Petroleum prices, which are not shown in Figure 5.7, are the one 
major exception to the trend of falling commodity prices. Movements 
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in petroleum prices are driven predominantly by actions of the OPEC 
cartel; the highest real prices were observed in the late 1970s. Accord-
ing to World Bank data, the price of petroleum in 1980 was 6.7 times 
higher than the price in 1960. The petroleum price in 2000 was 3.6 
times the 1960 price. While these higher petroleum prices have an im-
pact on all economies in the world, they would seem to have little to do 
with actual resource scarcity. 
The results shown in Figure 5.7 provide a powerful piece of data 
in support of sustainable development. During a period in which world 
population doubled, real commodity prices, excluding petroleum, fell 
by more than 50 percent. Many economic forces help explain this fairly 
remarkable outcome. Technological innovations have increased effi-
ciency in the use of resources and have often produced substitutes for 
resources when price increases have appeared. As Johnson emphasized 
to the AEA in the case of agricultural production, human knowledge 
has been instrumental. Trade liberalization and increased efficiency in 
global transport and communication have also played an important role. 
While a separate story could be told about the price trends in every 
major commodity, the common theme is one of falling prices and de-
Figure 5.7  Indices of World Commodity Prices, 1960–2000 (1960=100)
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creasing resource pressure, in spite of the enormous increase in world 
population. 
Trends in Poverty 
It is frequently, and appropriately, pointed out that increased food 
production or rising per capita incomes do not improve the lives of 
all people equally. Some segments of the population may be excluded 
from economic progress completely, or may even suffer declining liv-
ing standards at the same time that aggregate measures indicate im-
provement. The increase in food production shown above would be less 
reassuring if we discovered that all of the increase in consumption went 
to high-income consumers. One of the concerns about rapid population 
growth has been that it would lead to increased poverty, both because 
poor countries were those with the highest growth rates and because 
higher population growth rates might have negative distributional con-
sequences within countries (Birdsall, Kelley, and Sinding 2001; Cassen 
1994; Lam 1987, 1997). 
Data on poverty rates are much more difficult to come by than data 
on agricultural output or commodity prices, since poverty estimates re-
quire data at the level of individual households. Measuring poverty in 
developing countries is a complex and challenging task that has been 
the focus of extensive research. The absence of reliable and consistent 
data to estimate poverty was one of the main motivations for the World 
Bank’s effort to collect comparable household surveys on income 
and consumption in a large number of countries (Grosh and Glewwe 
2000). 
The issue has produced extensive debate over matters of measure-
ment, analysis, and interpretation, much of which has played out in the 
context of larger debates about the impact of globalization, interna-
tional trade, and the actions of international agencies. The ideal way to 
measure trends in poverty in any country would be to have a consistent 
series of large, nationally representative household surveys with de-
tailed information on income and consumption for a number of years. 
Very few developing countries met this ideal before the mid-1980s, and 
even after the launching of the World Bank’s ambitious Living Stan-
dards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys in the 1980s, many issues of 
incomplete coverage and data comparability remained. As is discussed 
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by Ravallion (2003) and Deaton (2001, 2002, 2003), most estimates of 
poverty use a combination of household survey data and national ac-
counts data.3 The survey data are used to provide detailed information 
on the distribution of income or consumption across households, but 
are often only available for one or two points in time. National accounts 
statistics can be used to estimate changes in mean income for every 
year, with the combination of the survey data and national accounts 
being used to estimate the percentage below a given poverty line in 
years when complete survey data are not available. An additional key 
methodological issue is the comparison of incomes across countries. 
It is standard to use Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) indices, which are 
based on the cost of purchasing a comparable basket of goods in each 
country to compare income and consumption across countries. 
The most comprehensive attempts to estimate poverty in this way 
have been done by researchers at the World Bank. Estimates covering 
the period 1981–2001 are presented in Figure 5.8, based on data taken 
from the World Bank’s PovertyNet Web site (World Bank 2004). Meth-
odological details and additional estimates are provided in Chen and 
Ravallion (2001). Figure 5.8 reports estimates of poverty based on one 
of the simple benchmark poverty lines that is often used—$1 a day in 
per capita household consumption. Note that the estimates are typically 
based on direct measures of consumption and therefore speak to the 
issue of changing trends in hunger as well. The top panel of Figure 5.8 
shows the percentage in poverty (the population headcount ratio); the 
bottom panel shows the absolute number in poverty, using 1981=100 
as a baseline for each region. For the total developing country popu-
lation, the “World” line in Figure 5.8 indicates that the percentage of 
the population in poverty in all developing countries by the $1 a day 
measure declined from 40.3 percent in 1981 to 21.3 percent in 2001. 
Impressive declines in poverty in China play a large role in the overall 
trend, although the poverty rate still declines from 31.6 percent to 22.8 
percent when China is excluded (not shown). This world decline was 
large enough to more than offset the substantial population growth in 
developing countries during this period, leading to a decline in the ab-
solute number in poverty in all developing countries of about 25 percent 
(from 1.48 billion to 1.10 billion).  
Figure 5.8 also shows poverty trends for major regions of the devel-
oping world and for the specific case of India.4 Looking at the regional 
118 Lam
Figure 5.8  Percentage and Absolute Number in Poverty by Region, 
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breakdowns in Figure 5.8, we see that the largest decline in poverty 
over this period took place in East Asia and the Pacific, where the $1 
a day poverty rate plummeted from 58 percent to 16 percent between 
1981 and 2001. Estimates for India indicate that the poverty headcount 
ratio fell from 55 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 2001. The absolute 
number of poor people in India is estimated to have stayed almost con-
stant over this 20-year period, showing small declines in the late 1990s. 
The declining poverty rates in India shown in Figure 5.8 are consistent 
with estimates of Deaton and Drèze (2002). 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa had more disappointing per-
formances over this period. The percentage of the population in poverty 
in Latin America remained roughly constant at around 10 percent, im-
plying about a 50 percent increase in the absolute number in poverty. 
Africa had by far the worst experience of any region, with the percent-
age in poverty rising from 42 percent to 47 percent. Combined with 
rapid population growth, this resulted in almost a doubling of the num-
ber of people in poverty in 20 years, an increase of 150 million.  
In addition to the large regional differences in both levels and trends 
in poverty shown in Figure 5.8, there are often large differences within 
a given country. A detailed examination of poverty in India by Deaton 
and Drèze (2002) shows significant declines in poverty in the 1990s but 
also shows regional differences in poverty increasing over the period, 
including no reduction in poverty in some of the states that already had 
the highest levels of poverty. A number of studies also indicate that in-
come inequality has increased in India and China even though poverty 
has declined. Higher income growth occurred in the highest income 
deciles (Chen and Wang 2001; Deaton and Drèze 2002). 
Although data on poverty rates before the 1980s are much more 
limited, most evidence indicates that the declines in poverty shown in 
Figure 5.8 for the period after 1980 were a continuation of declines in 
poverty over several decades. Sala-i-Martin (2002) combines national 
accounts data from 1970 to 1998 with the available data on individual 
country income distributions to estimate changes in the distribution of 
income in each country and for the world as a whole. Applying the $1 
per day poverty line to these distributions, he estimates that there have 
been substantial declines in poverty rates for the developing world as a 
whole over the entire period. His estimates of the levels of poverty are 
considerably lower than those estimated by Chen and Ravallion, but 
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the trends show a similar pattern: poverty fell rapidly in Asia, fell more 
slowly in Latin America, and increased substantially in Africa.  
In summarizing the data on world poverty trends in recent decades, 
we find that the overall picture is quite positive. The evidence since 
1980 indicates that the percentage of the world in extreme poverty (fall-
ing under the $1 a day measure) has been cut almost in half. The ab-
solute number of people in poverty has declined by about 25 percent. 
This good news must be balanced by a couple of sources of concern. 
First, these estimates imply that one in five people in the world continue 
to live in extreme poverty. Second, the trends have varied enormously 
across regions, with poverty increasing rather than decreasing in Africa. 
The percentage of the African population in poverty has risen to almost 
50 percent, and the absolute number of Africans in poverty roughly 
doubled between 1981 and 2001. 
THE RAPID DECLINE IN FERTILITY
The impressive ability of the world economy to absorb the popula-
tion growth of the last four decades is matched by equally remarkable 
declines in fertility rates. It is instructive to look at these declines in some 
detail and to consider their causes from an economic perspective. This 
section will pay particular attention to the case of Brazil, where fertility 
fell rapidly in the absence of significant family planning programs. 
Figure 5.9 shows the total fertility rate (TFR) for major world re-
gions from 1950 to 1999, based on United Nations Population Division 
(2003) estimates. The total fertility rate is the sum of the age-specific 
fertility rates in a given year and can be interpreted as the number of 
births a woman would have in her lifetime if she was exposed to the 
age-specific birth rates for that year. The total fertility rate for the world 
was around 5 births per woman for the five-year periods beginning in 
1950–1954 and ending in 1965–1969, then began to fall rapidly in the 
1970s. By the 1995–1999 period the world TFR had fallen to 2.8. De-
mographers use a TFR of 2.1 as a benchmark for replacement fertility, a 
rate that would have each couple replacing itself on average, with some 
additional births to compensate for those that didn’t survive to child-
bearing age.5 Freedman and Blanc (1992) found it useful to measure the 
percentage decline in fertility toward replacement level as a measure of 
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fertility decline. The difference between the TFR and replacement fer-
tility for the world fell from 2.9 to 0.7 between 1965 and 1999, meaning 
that fertility fell by 75 percent of the amount required to reach replace-
ment fertility. 
As shown in Figure 5.9, declines in fertility have been observed 
in all regions of the world. Asia and Latin America have had the fast-
est declines, following very similar patterns over the 50 years shown. 
In both regions the TFR fell from around 6.0 in 1950 to about 2.7 in 
1999. This decline is 82 percent of the decline necessary to reach re-
placement fertility. The pace of fertility decline has been significantly 
slower in Africa. While the TFR has clearly been declining in Africa, 
especially after 1980, the TFR for the region as a whole was still 5.3 
in 1995–1999, almost twice as high as for Asia and Latin America, the 
next-highest regions. The decline from the 1960 peak of 6.8 represents 
32 percent of the decline necessary to reach replacement fertility. 
Figure 5.10 shows the TFR for four specific countries for the period 
1950–1999—Kenya, India, Brazil, and Thailand—based on United Na-
tions estimates. Thailand is an example of a country experiencing rapid 
fertility decline, having dropped from a TFR of well over 6 in 1960–
1964 to near replacement level fertility by 1990–1994. Brazil’s fertil-
Figure 5.9  Total Fertility Rate for World Regions, 1950–1999













































ity decline is slightly slower, but Brazil had fallen to near replacement 
level fertility by 1995–1999. India began its fertility decline somewhat 
later than Brazil and Thailand and has had slower rates of decline. The 
TFR in India in 1995–1999 was about 3.3. Kenya, like most sub-Saha-
ran African countries, continued to have high fertility into the 1980s, 
with a TFR of over 7.0 in the 1980–1984 period. Fertility began to 
fall at a rapid rate later that decade, however, reaching about 4.5 in 
1995–1999. 
Fertility Decline, Investments in Human Capital, and Quantity-
Quality Tradeoffs
The patterns of fertility decline over the last 50 years are much 
clearer than are the determinants of the decline. While it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to survey the vast literature that has analyzed the 
determinants of fertility decline in developing countries, I will address 
a few issues that I believe are fundamental to understanding the eco-
nomics of fertility. As in the case of rising agricultural output and fall-
ing commodity prices, optimizing responses to changing incentives and 
Figure 5.10  Total Fertility Rate for Selected Countries, 1950–1999













































How the World Survived the Population Bomb   123
tradeoffs has played an essential role in the fertility declines of the last 
40 years. 
Declines in fertility across the developing world have coincided 
with substantial increases in the health and schooling of children. The 
negative relationship between fertility and children’s schooling is a 
strong empirical regularity, whether observed across populations, across 
time in a given population, or across families at a given point of time 
in a population. Not only are couples in developing countries having 
significantly fewer children than they were four decades ago, they are 
investing a great deal more in the human capital of those children. The 
tradeoff between the quantity and quality of children is one of the cen-
tral features of economic theories of fertility (Becker and Lewis 1973; 
Willis 1973; Lam 2003). Since his early writings on the economics of 
fertility, Becker has pointed out that rising incomes lead to substitu-
tions away from quantity of children and into quality of children, where 
quality is indicated by expenditures on children, including investments 
in schooling and health. Lam and Duryea (1999) applied the models of 
Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) to the case of rising parental 
schooling, noting that falling infant mortality and increased parental 
schooling could easily lead to a similar substitution of quality in place 
of quantity of children. This mechanism helps explain why the fertility 
decline has been so universal and why it has been combined with rapid 
increases in schooling.  
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
Brazil’s fertility decline makes for a particularly interesting case 
study. It is probably the best example of a developing country experi-
encing rapid fertility decline in the absence of a major family planning 
effort. Brazil is also a country for which we have excellent census and 
survey data going back to 1960, making it possible to analyze the fertil-
ity decline in great detail. As indicated in Figure 5.10, Brazil’s fertility 
decline was well underway by the late 1960s, and fertility fell rapidly in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This was a period in which the country was ruled 
by a military government that gave little support to family planning 
programs (Merrick and Berquó 1983; Martine 1996; Potter, Schmert-
mann, and Cavenaghi 2002). It is also noteworthy that the fertility de-
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cline began during the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s 
but continued at a similar pace during the recessionary 1980s. Research 
suggests that increases in schooling, especially for women, played a 
major role in this decline (Merrick and Berquó 1983; Lam and Duryea 
1999). 
Lam and Duryea use the cross-sectional relationship between wom-
en’s schooling and fertility to estimate the decline in fertility that would 
have resulted from increasing women’s schooling prior to 1984. They 
estimate that increases in women’s schooling could account for roughly 
70 percent of the large decrease in fertility that occurred in the 1960s 
and 1970s in Brazil. Figure 5.11 shows the relationship between wom-
en’s schooling and fertility in 1984 and in 2002. The 1984 relationship 
is taken from Lam and Duryea (1999); the pattern for 2002 is estimated 
using the 2002 PNAD survey, which includes roughly 10,000 women 
aged 45–59.6 
The mean number of children that had been born to women aged 
45–49 fell from 5.0 in 1984 to 3.5 in 2002 (not shown).7 This is a con-
siderably larger gap than the varying distance between the two lines for 
Figure 5.11  Number of Births by Years of Schooling, Women Ages 45–49, 
Brazil, 1984 and 2002
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children ever born in 1984 and in 2002 in Figure 5.11. This indicates 
that the increased schooling of women, which shifts the distribution of 
women to the right along the horizontal axis in Figure 5.11, plays an 
important role in explaining the fertility decline. Mean years of school-
ing for women aged 45–49 rose from 3.5 in 1984 to 6.4 in 2002. Impor-
tantly, this involves a shift away from the lowest levels of schooling, the 
levels associated with the highest fertility. 
The percentage of women aged 45–49 with zero years of schooling 
fell from 30 percent in 1984 to 14 percent in 2002, while the percent-
age going beyond the fourth grade rose from 24 percent to 53 percent. 
Given the strong relationship between schooling and fertility in Figure 
5.11, especially at the lowest schooling levels, these shifts in the school-
ing distribution imply large declines in fertility. 
Figure 5.11 also shows the number of surviving children by years of 
mother’s schooling. Several features should be noted about the relation-
ship between the number of surviving children, the number of children 
ever born, and years of schooling. First, there is the large gap between 
the number of children ever born and the number of children still alive 
Figure 5.12  Mean Schooling of 14-Year-Olds by Years of Schooling of 
Mother, Brazil, 1984 and 2002
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at the time of the 1984 survey for women with low schooling. Women 
with zero schooling, a large part of the sample, had lost 1.2 children 
on average, a mortality rate of 18.5 percent. Part of the high fertility of 
women with low schooling levels appears to have been a response to 
high infant mortality. Figure 5.11 also shows the large improvement in 
child survival as schooling increases: women with schooling of eight 
years or more had very few children die. These relationships suggest 
that as increased schooling leads to higher infant survival, women re-
spond by having fewer births. 
As noted above, it has been an empirical regularity around the 
world that falling fertility has been associated with increased invest-
ments in children’s human capital. Parental schooling can play an im-
portant role in this relationship, as suggested by economic theories of 
quantity-quality tradeoffs. Figure 5.12 shows the relationship between 
mother’s schooling and the schooling of 14-year-olds in Brazil in 1984 
and 2002, using the same household survey data as was used in Figure 
5.11. Figure 5.12 shows a strong positive relationship between mother’s 
schooling and children’s schooling, with an especially strong relation-
ship at low levels of schooling. In the 1984 data, 14-year-old children 
whose mothers had 15 or more years of schooling (university comple-
tion) were more than three grades ahead of 14-year-olds whose mothers 
had zero schooling. The 2002 relationship shows a slightly flatter slope 
to this curve, although there is still a gap of well over two grades be-
tween the highest and lowest schooling levels. 
Although Figure 5.12 gives the impression that there has been rela-
tively little improvement in schooling between 1984 and 2002, there 
was in fact a large increase in mean schooling over this period. The 
mean years of schooling of 14-year-olds grew from 3.5 years to 5.4 
years, a 54 percent increase. As can be seen in Figure 5.12, the in-
crease in schooling of 14-year-olds, holding mother’s schooling con-
stant, is significantly smaller than this 1.9 year overall improvement. 
As with the fertility relationship discussed above, this indicates that 
the increased schooling of women is an important factor in explaining 
increased schooling of their children over this period. The improve-
ments at the bottom of the schooling distribution are once again im-
portant, since moving women from zero to four years of schooling has 
a big impact on the schooling of their children. Lam and Duryea show 
that the strong relationship between parental schooling and children’s 
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schooling continues to be observed when regressions are estimated with 
additional controls for variables such as region and urban or rural loca-
tion, with the effect of father’s schooling almost as large as the effect of 
mother’s schooling.
While many factors, including the increased provision of family 
planning services, play a role in explaining the rapid declines in fertility 
in the last 40 years, improvements in child survival and in the schooling 
of parents clearly are key parts of the story. Brazil’s case is particularly 
strong evidence of this, since there was very little increase in family 
planning. The fact that investments in children’s schooling and health 
increased at the same time fertility declined is one of the most important 
signs of the changing behavior of parents, since it means that today’s 
generation of young people is the best educated in human history. Given 
the importance that increases in human knowledge have had in helping 
the world survive the population explosion, it is reassuring to know that 
the next generation of adults will be even better educated than the gen-
erations that dealt with the challenges of the last 40 years. 
CONCLUSION
The years from 1950 to 2000 form one of the most interesting peri-
ods of demographic change in history. The 1950s saw the annual growth 
rate of world population begin a dramatic increase that peaked at over 
2 percent a year in the mid-1960s, followed by a return to the 1950 
level of 1.4 at the end of the 1990s. The doubling of world population 
between 1960 and 2000 was by far the shortest doubling time in human 
history, a phenomenon that will almost surely never be seen again. This 
population explosion essentially played itself out within a half-century, 
and as it did so it presented an unprecedented challenge to the world’s 
ability to feed itself and provide resources necessary for modern human 
existence. 
This chapter has argued that the world has already survived the 
population explosion. While the demographic impact of the rapid popu-
lation growth of recent decades will continue for several more decades, 
the population growth rate of the world will continue to fall rapidly, re-
turning the world to the kind of growth rates seen in the early twentieth 
century and even earlier. During this population explosion the world 
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managed to increase per capita food production, decrease poverty, and 
reduce the prices of most commodities, both renewable and nonrenew-
able. This is an amazing accomplishment that we should not lose sight 
of as we move beyond the late twentieth century. 
Understanding how the world survived the population explosion 
requires an understanding of both the demography and the economics 
at work during these decades of rapid population growth. Demographi-
cally, it is important to recognize that it was rapidly falling mortality 
that began the population explosion and that it was unexpectedly rapid 
falls in fertility that brought it to an end. The economics of markets, 
individual responses to incentives, and returns to human capital are im-
portant aspects of the story. The fact that per capita food production was 
31 percent higher in 2003 than it was in 1961 reflects both innovations 
in agricultural technology and responses by farmers to economic incen-
tives. The fact that an index of nonenergy commodity prices fell 54 
percent between 1960 and 2000 reflects technological advances and the 
impact of international trade. And the fact that the world’s total fertil-
ity rate fell from 5.0 to 2.8 between 1965 and 2000 reflects the rational 
responses of couples to increased child survival and increased parental 
schooling. Parents not only chose to have fewer children but also chose 
to invest more in the health and schooling of those children, making this 
current cohort of young people the best educated in history.  
In considering issues of sustainable development and the world’s 
ability to meet increasing resource pressures, the history of the past 
50 years must be a source of optimism. At the same time, challenges 
remain. While world poverty rates fell impressively in recent decades, 
with the percentage of people living on less than $1 a day being cut in 
half between 1980 and 2001, poverty increased substantially over this 
period in Africa. Nor has Africa been able to increase food production 
fast enough to keep pace with population. Beyond that, this chapter has 
not dealt with the many environmental concerns that are often raised 
by those who are less optimistic about the world’s future. These issues 
are critical, especially when markets may do a poor job of creating ap-
propriate incentives, as in the case of ocean fishing or global warming. 
In considering whether the world will be able to meet these challenges 
of the twenty-first century, however, we should not forget how bleak 
prospects looked in the 1960s. The world’s ability to survive the popu-
lation explosion may be one of the most important lessons about human 
adaptability that we will ever receive.  
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Notes
This research was supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development, part of the U.S. National Institutes of Health.
 1.  Estimates before 1950 are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Summary Es-
timates,” which are based on a number of historical sources (2003). Estimates 
and projections from 1950 to 2050 are taken from United Nations Population 
Division (2003). See Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000) for discussion of projections 
to 2050.
 2.  The growth rates in Figure 5.2 are based on estimates of the total population for 
each single year up to 2000. The figure shows three-year moving averages of 
these growth rates, which serve to remove some of the short-run year-to-year 
volatility. The growth rates for the period after 2000 are based on United Nations 
population projections for every fifth year (2000, 2005, etc.). For example, the 
growth rate centered on 2002.5 for the medium variant is the average annual 
growth rate implied by the U.N. medium variant estimates for the population in 
2000 and 2005. 
 3. National accounts data are the aggregate data on measures such as GNP and 
industrial output that are produced by national statistical agencies.
 4.  Note that India is included in the “South Asia” series, in addition to being repre-
sented separately.
 5. The actual value of replacement fertility depends on mortality rates between 
birth and childbearing, and thus is different for every population. The figure of 
2.1 is a rough benchmark.
 6. PNAD stands for Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios, or National 
Household Survey.
 7.  Note that most of these births would have taken place when these women were 
20 to 35 years old, so this decline roughly describes the decline in fertility be-
tween the 1960s and the 1980s.
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